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“Judges should apply the law, not make it.” That plea ap-
pears perennially in American politics.1 American legal scholars 
belittle it as a “simple-minded demand”2 that is “silly and mis-
leading.”3  It is, they suggest, a product of lay naïveté.  “[E]very 
lawyer knows that judges make law—it’s their job.”4 That the 
plea finds resonance, however, is symptomatic of a popular per-
ception of misalignment of civil justice with social goals. If law is 
not applied, but is left to judges to be made, it cannot be the ex-
pression of the people’s social goals that it should be.5  
                                                 
1 Compare 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McCloskey, ed., 
1967; first published 1804) (“[E]very prudent and cautious judge … will re-
member, that his duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret 
and apply it.”) with George W. Bush, President Announces Judge John Roberts 
as Supreme Court Nominee, July 19, 2005 (“He will strictly apply the Constitu-
tion and laws, not legislate from the bench.”), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050719-7.html. 
2 John J. Flynn, “Making Law” and “Finding Facts”- Unavoidable Duties of an Inde-
pendent Judiciary, UTAH BAR JOURNAL, August 6, 2005, available at 
www.utahbar.org/barjournal/archives/000356/html. 
3 Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk. Judges do make law — it's their job, USA 
TODAY EDITORIAL/OPINION SECTION, August 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-08-23-forum-
judges_x.htm.
4 ID. 
5 See, e.g., Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer—AU Washington College of 
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A glance beyond our shores dispels the notion that the 
American public is naïve to expect judges to apply rather than to 
make law. An Englishman, H.L.A. Hart, reminded U.S. jurists 
that “conventional legal thought in all countries conceives as the 
standard judicial function: the impartial application of determi-
nant existing rules in the settlement of disputes.”6 Nowhere, ex-
cept perhaps here in the United States, has recognition that some 
judges, sometimes, exceptionally make law, shaken the conven-
tional idea that the standard function of civil litigation is apply-
ing law to facts. And even here, that shaken faith is a relatively 
recent development. 
American obsession with judicial law making has its price: 
indifference to judicial law applying. We use our methods of ap-
plying law to facts—e.g., jury trials, summary judgments and 
complaint screening—haphazardly rather than routinely. We rely 
on litigating parties to ascertain the subject for decision rather 
than on judges. We depend upon those parties to invoke mecha-
nisms for deciding rather than on courts. As a result trials are 
vanishing, summary judgment motions are sporadic, and com-
plaints that are carefully reviewed by counsel or by court at or 
before serving less common than they should be. It is said of 
American civil justice that the “highest goal is for courts not to 
apply law to facts.”7  
If truth be told, practically we have no method for judges, 
as a matter of routine, to apply law to facts. Our failure leads 
American legal scholars to question whether applying law to 
                                                                                                                      
Law, Jan. 13, 
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC218978
5256B810 23-24 (2005) (“The judge is to apply the law. … [R]emember, a judge 
is a person who’s been entrusted in a democratic society with power, although 
that judge is not elected. So if in fact you give judges too many open-ended 
procedures, rules and practices, what you will discover is that a man, a 
woman who suddenly has this power, for better or for worse, maybe uncon-
sciously, maybe not even wanting to, will substitute her judgment, his judg-
ment, for the judgment of the legislature. And that’s wrong in a democracy.”). 
6 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 971 (1977). 
7 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 989 (1987). 
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facts is a necessary feature of civil procedure at all. In their view, 
process and participation in the process are primary; decisions 
that determine rights according to law are secondary, at best, and 
impossible of achievement, at worst.  
This forum recognizes our need to “Imagin[e] New Struc-
tures of Civil Procedure.” How can we do that? “Imagining” 
truly new structures of civil procedure is a daunting challenge 
beyond any one person’s capabilities. Wisely this forum recog-
nizes that there is one way that we can imagine new systems 
without stretching our imaginations beyond the breaking point; 
we need only be willing to open our minds to ideas from other 
legal systems.  
In this essay I discuss the German method of judicial ap-
plying of law to facts. Our two societies and our two legal sys-
tems are sufficiently similar to make their experiences mutually 
relevant and informative. Above all, the two systems of civil jus-
tice are united by a common goal: “the fair, accurate and efficient 
vindication of private rights and interests based on the existing 
legal, political and social order.”8  
German civil justice does have a method for routinely ap-
plying law to facts. It is called, in German, the “Relationstechnik,” 
that is, in English, literally “relationship technique.”9 In this essay 
I introduce it to American lawyers and judges. After a brief pres-
entation of it, I show how it helps keep German civil justice—as 
Philip Howard might say— “sane,”10 by guiding litigation.   
                                                 
8 PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 575 (2004).  
9 The Relationstechnik is little discussed in English. To my knowledge, until 2004, 
the only work was Walter O. Weyrauch, The Art of Drafting Judgments:  A Modified 
German Case Method, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1957).  For two recent works, see also 
Christoph Engel, The Impact of Representation Norms on the Quality of Judicial Deci-
sions 16 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 
2004/13, 2004), available at http://www.mpp-
rdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2004_13online.pdf; Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Prob-
lem Solving:  German Methodology from a Comparative Perspective, 14 LEGAL EDUC. 
REV. 19 (2003-2004), available at 
http://www.ler.edu.au/pdf/volumes/ler_vol14_1_2003_04.pdf.. The paucity of 
English-language treatments may be attributed to the fact that the method is 
principally taught at the courts in the practical training period of German legal 
education rather than in the university law faculty. 
10 See Philip K. Howard, Making Civil Justice Sane, CITY JOURNAL (Spring 2006). 
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The Relationstechnik of applying law to facts 
 
 The syllogism is the basis of the Relationstechnik: the legal 
rule is the major premise, the facts are the minor premise, and the 
judicial decision is the logical conclusion. The Relationstechnik is 
taught to all German jurists, whether they become judges or law-
yers. It is a product of more than a century of judicial practice. 
Two “bookends” of the Relationstechnik guide judges in ap-
plying law to facts: the legislatively-promulgated statute (das Gesetz) 
and the judicially-written judgment (das Urteil).  
The statute is the fundamental concept of all German law. 
German statutes take the form of syllogistic norms. The major 
premise is that a legal consequence prescribed by statute applies 
when a generally described state of facts is present. The minor 
premise is that a particular state of facts fulfills the statutorily 
prescribed state of facts.  
The Relationstechnik works best when statutes in substance 
and form are good. Bad statutes make bad decisions. When stat-
utes reflect prevailing conceptions of justice, the Relationstechnik 
is spared the tension of choosing between statutory rules and jus-
tice.11 When statutes are well drafted, the Relationstechnik func-
tions smoothly; hard cases are few and easy cases are many.  
Well-drafted statutes coordinate with each other well. 
Well-drafted statutes are clear who may invoke them and what 
the consequences of their invocation are. Well-drafted statutes, to 
the extent possible, have judges find objective facts rather than 
make subjective valuings. Well-drafted statutes do not expect 
judges to make political or other social policy decisions. While 
often well-drafted statutes have judges value individual equities 
and find subjective facts such as state of mind, they minimize use 
of such decisions to the extent they can. When they cannot avoid 
such decisions, they guide those decisions by setting boundaries 
and by giving examples.  
Statutes are not drafted well by accident. Most modern le-
gal systems have a central office responsible for the technical 
                                                 
11 Article 20(2) of the German Constitution binds judicial decisions to “statute 
and justice” (Gesetz und Recht).  
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quality of statutes. In Germany, preparation and perpetuation of 
good legislation is the raison d’être of the Federal Ministry of Jus-
tice.12 The Ministry engages in that work some of the best-
qualified jurists of the land: former appellate judges.  
While statutes guide law application, judgments validate 
their correct application. Judgments have four parts: (1) a caption 
that identifies the parties and the lawsuit (“Rubrum”); (2) a state-
ment of the decision and of the relief ordered (“Tenor”); (3) a Tat-
bestand;13 and (4) the grounds for decision (“Entscheidungsgründe”), 
hereafter referred to as the “justification.” All four parts are subject 
to strict rules as to style. The first two parts need no explanation: the 
last two do.  
 The Tatbestand is a short statement of the parties’ legal claims 
and of their assertions of fact. It is not a finding of facts and thus is 
not an analogue to the findings of fact of an American bench deci-
sion. The Tatbestand should include: the subject matter of the law-
suit, a sketch of the facts detailed, but only insofar as is necessary to 
establish clearly the subject of the lawsuit, the evidence offered by 
the parties, the applications of the parties, relevant history of the 
lawsuit, and specific references to the file. It should not include: facts 
not necessary to the decision of the case, party statements made in 
the proceedings that are no longer relevant, legal arguments of the 
parties, statements of the law, or normative evaluations of the facts. 
 The justification applies law to facts. It determines the facts of 
the Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of 
                                                 
12 The Ministry’s website identifies its central mission: “ Law constitutes the 
foundation of our free democracy. Guaranteeing the rule of law and pursuing 
further refinements in this area is a central task of legal policy, and thus also of 
the Federal Ministry of Justice. The legislative work undertaken by the Minis-
try pursues this objective, and encompasses the preparation of new legislation 
as well as the amendment or repeal of existing laws.” 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/9f0ca456efff7ed197073e2dd5d372a5,0/Minist
ry/Structure_and_Organisation_14p.html.  
13 Tatbestand is a legal term which has no single English translation. Depending 
upon the context in which it appears, a different English translation is appropri-
ate. In this essay, Tatbestand refers to a specific part of a German judgment that is 
so designated. There is no formal counterpart to the Tatbestand in an American 
judgment. To avoid inducing a false understanding, it is left here in the original 
German. Readers should note that this meaning is different from the Tatbestand of 
German criminal law, which might be translated “elements of the offense.” 
6 THE BOUNDARIES OF LITIGATION 
the applicable rules. The process of applying law to facts is not a 
mechanical act of mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative 
evaluation. 
 The justification follows a format that in clarity and brevity 
facilitates understanding. It begins by stating the result of the law-
suit and by identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or 
denies that the plaintiff’s claim is permissible under procedural law 
and well-founded in substantive law. For example, a typical justifi-
cation might begin: “The plaintiff’s action is in all respects permissi-
ble and well-founded. Pursuant to § 488 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of 
the Civil Code the plaintiff has a right arising from the loan agree-
ment of December 12, 2007 to repayment of the loan of €75,000.” 
The justification then proceeds to address systematically the 
applicable rule, its elements and, if the judgment denies plaintiff’s 
claims, all rules that might support any of the claims. For each ele-
ment of the rule, insofar as necessary, the justification clarifies the 
legal definition of the element as it relates to the particular case. 
Here the justification may interpret the applicable statute, but only to 
the extent directly relevant to determining whether the facts in the 
present case fulfill the elements of the statutory norm. Abstract dis-
cussions of law have no place.  
 The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It fo-
cuses on those facts material to decision of the case. Immaterial facts 
have no place in the justification except as is necessary to understand 
the court’s decision. The justification starts from undisputed facts. 
Where facts are disputed, the justification evaluates the evidence that 
leads the court to decide as it does. The justification does not discuss 
burden of proof other than with respect to material facts in dispute. 
Once the justification has clarified material and disputed 
facts, it subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule. 
The judgment certifies that the procedure has fulfilled consti-
tutional guarantees. These include that every exercise of state power 
has been justified by and grounded in statute, that the parties were 
heard and that they received equal treatment under law. The judg-
ment is an act of an impartial and impersonal public authority fur-
nishing the official and objective interpretation and application of 
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law.14 It helps parties understand why the court decided as it did.  
Ideally it convinces losing parties that the outcome is legally correct; 
at a minimum, it demonstrates that the process was rational.  
 
The German judgment as “narrative” 
 
Recent American writing on civil procedure conceptualizes 
contemporary American trials as a form of narrative, or more accu-
rately, as a form of presentation of “two competing narratives … 
where an ‘either-or’ choice will have to be made.” The narrative is 
how we “actually organize and analyze the vast amounts of infor-
mation involved in making a legal judgment.”15 In this terminology, 
the German judgment is the narrative of German civil proceedings.  
The difference between German and American proceedings 
narrative-wise is that the German judgment presents “the standard 
narrative historiography, where there exists a single account of 
events …,”  while contemporary American proceedings present at 
trial two-fully formed and competing narratives that have been de-
veloped pretrial. No wonder, then, that German civil procedure is 
more efficient than is its American counterpart: where American 
proceedings write two screen-plays and produce both screenplays 
jointly in one trial, German civil procedure records only one report 
for posterity and does not even bother to dramatize it. While the 
German cinema is poorer for the paucity of scripts, the German le-
gal system is richer in determinations of right. 
 The efficiency of German civil procedure does not end in it 
making one unproduced screenplay do where American proce-
dures create and produce two. The monopoly position of the Ger-
man narrative avoids the excesses of competing narratives. The 
German narrative focuses on the legally material. It does not battle 
for the reader’s imagination. It does not bring into its story legally 
immaterial, but humanly appealing, detail. It does not leave out le-
                                                 
14 See Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 1, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll 
eds., 2005). 
15 ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE TRIAL NARRATIVE, in THE 
TRIAL ON TRIAL: VOL. 1 TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 157 (Anthony Duff et al., eds. 
2004). 
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gally material matters that do not contribute to its justification. It is 
concerned with the validity of its conclusions. It has no cause to 
seek deconstruction of  a competing version on grounds unrelated 
to the validity of those conclusions.  
The writer of the narrative in German civil procedure is the 
judge. The judge is assigned the task to write the story of whether 
the plaintiff has established facts that fulfill all of the elements of a 
statutory right. The parties provide the judge with the materials the 
judge needs for that work. The goal of their cooperation is a deci-
sion according to law. The individual elements required by statute 
to establish a claim are the “spectacles” through which the judge 
views the case. What the judge can see through the spectacles mat-
ters; everything else is immaterial.16
The “sporting theory of justice” is no model for German 
court proceedings; there is no trial by battle between competing 
champions. There is little theater, ceremony is sparing, courtrooms 
are modest and judges preside from an altitude of a few inches 
rather than from a height of a couple of feet. Parties and their attor-
neys talk directly with the judge and with each other. The atmos-
phere is more cooperative and less confrontational than that of their 
American counterparts. German court proceedings resemble joint 
projects such as assembling a jigsaw puzzle, completing a cross-
word puzzle or conducting a scavenger hunt. The principal differ-
ence between these joint activities and German court proceedings, is 
that in court one party wants to establish that one piece is necessar-
ily missing! 
 
The Relationstechnik as guide to applying law to facts 
 
The Relationstechnik bounds legal proceedings without, 
however, strait-jacketing them. It avoids the two extremes of 
American civil procedure: the single-issue focus of historic com-
mon law special pleading and the legally-unfocused narrative of 
contemporary notice pleading. It brings about issue narrowing 
without, however, cutting off the right to be heard. The “golden 
                                                 
16 JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, DIE KONSTITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES: STUDIEN ZUM 
VERHÄLTNIS VON TATSACHENFESTSTELLUNG UND RECHTSANWENDUNG 22-24 
(1965). 
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rule” of German civil justice is that there are no surprise deci-
sions.17 We discuss here four of the ways in which the Relation-
stechnik sets boundaries to litigation and keeps civil justice 
aligned with social goals: (1) gate-keeping; (2) case-structuring 
through issue framing; (3) focusing witness testimony; and (4) 
deferring issue deciding. 
 
(1)  Gate-keeping 
 
The Relationstechnik together with the cost system18 strive to 
keep out of the civil justice system potential lawsuits that are un-
founded in fact or law or are procedurally defective, without, how-
ever, screening out meritorious claims. The plaintiff begins a lawsuit 
by filing a complaint with the court. Before the court serves the 
complaint on the defendant, it assigns the case to a judge who 
makes a preliminary review of the complaint for procedural pre-
requisites and other patent deficiencies. Already at this stage the 
Relationstechnik anticipates the judgment that is to come. The plain-
tiff must plead a case that has a plausible chance of success. While 
the plaintiff need not plead the legal basis on which the complaint 
rests, the plaintiff must plead facts upon which relief could be 
granted. Moreover, the plaintiff must plead the proof that the plain-
tiff intends to rely upon to prove the factual assertions, i.e., the 
plaintiff must “substantiate” the complaint’s factual allegations. A 
properly substantiated complaint includes all material documents 
in plaintiff’s possession, designates all material documents in the 
possession of others and identifies the testimony on which the 
plaintiff plans to rely. It should state the facts so exactly that, based 
on the information provided, the court could determine that the 
claimed legal relief should be granted.  
The judge’s preliminary review of the complaint and the cost 
system impel plaintiffs’ counsel to ground complaints in existing 
law and in facts that counsel has a reasonable chance of proving. 
The expectation of preliminary review helps deter frivolous com-
                                                 
17 Helmut Rüßmann, Grundregeln der Relationstechnik, 
 http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.de/zpo2004/Vorlesung/relationstechnik.htm
18 In Germany, the loser pays.  
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plaints. Yet that review should not deter many meritorious com-
plaints, since plaintiffs do not plead at their peril. 
Should the judge have concerns about whether the proce-
dural prerequisites are met, or about whether the complaint suffi-
ciently substantiates the factual allegations, the judge is to direct the 
plaintiff to clarify the point before dismissing the case.19 Moreover, 
while it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to plead the facts, it is up to 
the judge to know the law and to identify the applicable legal rule. 
In Germany, as in other civil law countries, the maxims jura novit 
curia (the court know the law) and da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius (give 
me the facts, I will give you the law) apply. So long as there is any 
legal rule that would support relief on the facts alleged, the judge is 
to direct service of the complaint. The plaintiff’s incorrect choice of 
rule is of no moment.  
Once the judge directs service and the defendant is served, 
the defendant is required to answer the complaint. The defendant’s 
answer is subject to requirements similar to those governing the 
complaint: it must be true, complete, specific, and substantiated.  
 
(2)  Case-structuring through issue framing 
 
 Coincident with the preliminary review the judge deter-
mines how the case is to proceed further: whether the case will use 
additional written proceedings or will use a so-called early first 
hearing.  The judge’s choice is purely pragmatic: the judge selects 
the method that the judge thinks is more likely to be more efficient 
in the case. A party dissatisfied with the choice may request that the 
judge use the other method, in which case the party should state 
why the party believes that the other method would be more effi-
cient. The determinant of efficiency is ordinarily which method is 
more likely to simplify and hasten framing of the material and dis-
puted issues. The judges with whom I have spoken have told me 
that most judges prefer an early oral hearing in contested cases. 
Prior to the first hearing, or the exchange of further written 
pleadings, as the case may be, the judge is required to prepare for 
                                                 
19 See Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of Ger-
man Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 25, 33 (1998); MURRAY & 
STÜRNER, supra note 8, at 210. 
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the future proceedings. Preparations may include: (1) directing the 
parties to supplement their pleadings, (2) directing government au-
thorities to provide information and documents, (3) ordering the 
personal appearance of the parties, (4) summoning witnesses 
named by a party to the hearing, and (5) ordering the production of 
documents or things and making premises and other things avail-
able for observation. In some cases, based on these preparations, it is 
possible to resolve the entire case at the first hearing. 
 In this stage the judge structures the lawsuit without finally 
deciding anything. The judge works with the parties to identify 
those issues that both are material to plaintiff’s claims and that are 
in dispute. This early structuring of the case through issue framing 
plays an important role in keeping German civil justice within 
bounds. It identifies the legal rules under consideration for applica-
tion, the elements of those rules, and the evidence necessary to es-
tablish the elements of the rule. The judge points out to the parties 
weaknesses in their particular claims and inquires of them how they 
plan to meet those claims.  
Structuring the case and framing issues not only guides the 
judge in subsequent consideration of the case, it also helps the par-
ties reach a settlement of the case more expeditiously and reasona-
bly. The parties can see which rules will determine the decision and 
which facts are needed. Some judges told me that they consider 
structuring one of their most important judicial duties. 
 To an American accustomed to very formal exchanges be-
tween judge and counsel, the early first hearing to clarify issues is 
remarkable. By American standards, these hearings are intensely 
interactive, comparatively cooperative, and fruitfully informal.20 
They resemble American pretrial conferences more than American 
trials. They differ from American pretrial conferences, however, in 
important ways. Most remarkable from an American perspective is 
the role of the parties. Typically the judge summons the parties 
themselves to the early first hearing and speaks directly with them. 
These hearings are neither American-style discovery nor American-
                                                 
20 Murray and Stürner describe them at some length. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra 
note 8, at 256-59. 
12 THE BOUNDARIES OF LITIGATION 
style trial.21 Their focus is on identifying material issues of fact that 
are actually in dispute between the parties; it is not on uncovering 
unknown facts or on proving known ones or on possible presenta-
tion of a narration later. The judge probes the potential claims and 
the facts needed to support the claims. In essence, the judge turns to 
the party and the party’s attorney concerned and asks: “Now on 
this issue are you seriously going to dispute the fact?” 
What prevents the party or the party’s attorney from re-
sponding: so let the other side prove it? The German Code of Civil 
Procedure (“ZPO”).  ZPO § 138 imposes on parties a duty of coop-
eration in clarifying the issues in the case. ZPO § 138(1) requires the 
parties to give their declarations concerning factual circumstances 
completely and truthfully; ZPO §138(2) requires that they state their 
positions with respect to the facts asserted by the opponent. These 
discussions are not evidentiary. They do not constitute taking testi-
mony of the parties. They amount to clarification of the factual as-
sertions of the parties that are necessary for the eventual application 
of the law to the facts. ZPO § 138(3) provides that an asserted fact 
will be treated as admitted if the other party is silent and fails to 
contest it. ZPO § 138(4) provides that only in limited circumstances 
does a declaration of lack of knowledge serve to put a matter in dis-
pute. Moreover, ZPO § 138(2) is interpreted to require that a mere 
denial of fact is not sufficient to put a fact in dispute. A party in 
most cases must explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if the fact 
asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party 
must substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it.22 
Thus, if in the course of the hearing or in the pleadings, one party 
admits a fact asserted by the other, there is no need to prove the 
fact. In relatively short order the judge can inform the parties of the 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., AmericanLaw Institute Study on Paths to a “Bet-
ter Way”: Litigation Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 824, 854 n.109 (incorrectly so characterizing the hearing). 
22 Cf. Frederick D. Wells, A Justice Factory, JUSTICE THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL 
PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 196, 202 (1917): “The court 
could practically say: “Now on this issue are you seriously going to dispute 
the fact? As a reasonable man, are you denying it?” If he answers “Perhaps it 
is so, but, let the other side prove it,” it ought to be possible for the court to 
throw his technical objections out of the window.”  
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applicable legal rules and get their agreement on which matters of 
fact are material to those rules and are in dispute.  
 
(3) Focusing witness testimony 
 
Thanks to such structuring, many cases conclude without 
oral testimony of witnesses ever being necessary. Judges I spoke 
with estimated that this may be true of well more than half of all 
cases filed. Where witness testimony is taken, framing issues helps 
focus and expedite the testimony that is taken. 
When it comes to taking the testimony of witnesses, German 
civil justice is just-in-time justice.  The judge takes evidence only on 
party request and only after the judge so orders.23 The judge is to 
order taking evidence only when necessary to convince the judge of 
the truth or untruth of a particular fact that is disputed by the par-
ties and that is material to the judge’s decision of the case. Thus, the 
judge should not take evidence to prove undisputed facts, facts 
generally known to the judge, facts presumed by statute to be true 
until the contrary is proven, favorable facts established by the other 
party’s submissions, disputed main facts established by undisputed 
facts, disputed facts the truth of which the judge is convinced of 
without taking evidence, and facts not necessary for the judgment 
(e.g., two alternatives for granting relief are allowed and one is al-
ready acknowledged). 
The judge’s control of evidence taking does not, however, 
prevent parties from insisting on taking evidence that they believe is 
relevant to deciding material issues in dispute. German judges told 
me that one of the surest ways to ensure that a lower court is re-
versed on appeal is to reject an application to take evidence without 
strong justification. Such a refusal counts as a violation of the 
                                                 
23 John Langbein has written eloquently of The German Advantage in Civil Pro-
cedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1985). His main theme is that “by assigning 
judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the most 
troublesome aspects of our practice.” Id. at 824. His article led to a flurry of 
discussion that has continued over twenty years. A recent review can be found 
in Bradley Bryan, Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s Conception 
of Comparative Law and Procedural Justice in Question, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 521, 523 (2004). 
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judge’s ZPO § 139 duty of elucidation discussed in the next subsec-
tion. 
 
(4)  Deferring issue decision-making 
 
Case structuring and issue framing work are powerful tools 
for promoting efficient conduct of civil justice because German 
judges can and do defer final decisions of individual aspects of 
cases until they are prepared to decide the case as a whole. German 
judges decide no issues before their time.24 The critical moment in a 
German lawsuit is how law applies to facts as of the last oral hear-
ing. German parties do not have to commit irrevocably early in the 
lawsuit to a single theory of the case. While judges are authorized to 
reject evidence for being offered too late, and often do that, their en-
thusiasm for such expediting measures is tempered by their ever-
present ZPO § 139 duty of elucidation which assures the parties 
their constitutional right to be heard guaranteed by the German 
Constitution.25 ZPO § 139 is a far-reaching prescription that the 
judge thoroughly discuss all aspects of the case with the parties. It 
completely rules out trial by ambush. ZPO § 139(2) requires that the 
judge call to a party’s attention and give the party an opportunity to 
comment on any non-trivial issue that the party has apparently 
overlooked or has considered insignificant or where the judge’s un-
derstanding of the point of fact or law differs from the understand-
ing of the parties. 
German civil procedure seeks in this way to sequence issue 
deciding in a manner that is both efficient and just. In many cases, 
the applicable legal rule can not simply be read from the statute. In-
stead, it is often it necessary to search the statute for the rule, to 
compare the rule to the facts, to revisit the statute in light of the 
facts, and to examine the facts again in light of the rules. This proc-
ess of going back and forth was identified in the first part of the 
                                                 
24 Paul Masson advertising slogan “We will sell no wine before its time.” See, 
e.g., a clip with Orson Wells. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpj0t2ozPWY 
25 Article 103. 
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twentieth century and has since assumed a place in the description 
of law application in Germany.26  
 
American reflections on the German Relationstechnik 
 
 The ideals that undergird the German Relationstechnik are 
no strangers to American civil justice. For much of the 20th cen-
tury the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion stated as a tenet of the rule of the law that the judge’s “duty 
is the application of general law to particular instances.”27 The 
idea that civil procedure should guide deciding anchored our 
civil justice system throughout the 19th century. Stephen on Plead-
ing, the most often printed of all one volume treatises on civil 
procedure of that century, famously begins: “In the course of 
administering justice between litigating parties there are two suc-
cessive objects,—to ascertain the subject for decision, and to de-
cide.” 28 Proponents of narrative litigation acknowledge that even 
today the received view of the American trial describes an under-
lying substance29 that seems to me scarcely different from the Re-
lationstechnik: (1) construct an accurate, value-free account of 
what occurred, (2) fairly categorize whether that account fits 
                                                 
26 See OSKAR HARTWIEG & HANS ALBRECHT HESSE, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG IM 
ZIVILPROZEß:  EIN STUDIENBUCH ÜBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFÜHL UND ROUTINE IN 
GUTACHTEN UND URTEIL at 78-79 (1981) („Die Lehre vom Pendelblick“). 
27 Canon 20, Canons of Judicial Ethics Adopted by the American Bar Association at 
its Forty-Seventh Annual at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on July 9, 1924, reprinted in 
REPORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSO-
CIATION HELD AT DETROIT MICHIGAN SEPTEMBER 2, 3, AND 4, 1925, 916, 922 
(1925), provided: “A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application 
of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not 
of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a sys-
tem if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a 
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on 
him.” It remained in force until the Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted 
August 16, 1972. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND COD OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS AMENDED AUGUST 1980, 61 
(1981).  
28 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS 1 (1824).  
29 BURNS, supra note 15. 
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within the substantive law, and (3) deliver a verdict that the party 
with the burden of proof has established each of the elements of 
the claim.  
 American civil procedure has, however, never enjoyed the 
success of the German Relationstechnik. It has swung from one ex-
treme to the other: from allowing parties to dispute only one 
point of law or fact, as was the case in common law special plead-
ing, to allowing parties to put forth all manner of claims con-
strained only slightly by statutory law. To keep the trial in 
bounds and to prevent unfair surprise, special pleading pre-
cluded parties from addressing all but one issue. To remedy the 
ills that followed from premature issue narrowing, the system 
introduced contemporary discovery to assure that parties did not 
narrow issues with incomplete knowledge. But the cure was 
worse than the ill: few cases can support complete discovery. 
The inability of American civil procedure to narrow issues 
without cutting off consideration of matters later found to be ma-
terial has rendered American civil procedure a failure. Contem-
porary America civil justice cannot do efficiently and justly that 
the public rightly expects of it: apply law to facts to determine 
rights.  
Common law special pleading and contemporary discov-
ery have one thing in common: both rely on the good will of the 
parties’ attorneys to narrow the issues.30 Problematic in any sys-
tem, such an approach is especially dubious in an adversary sys-
tem, particularly in an adversary system such as has developed 
in the United States, where the bar is diverse and open rather 
than limited and closed as it had been in England.  
When the nineteenth century reformers contemplated abo-
lition of common law pleading, some also contemplated shifting 
responsibility for issue narrowing from the parties to a neutral 
magistrate as in classical Roman law. Aware of the possibility, 
but apparently not familiar with a working system of such nar-
rowing, they hesitated to import a “foreign style of architecture.” 
Instead, they chose to try first to “build with old materials and 
                                                 
30 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 505, 585 (2000). 
 Applying Law to Facts in Germany 17   
after the old fashions.”31 They tried: April 12, 2008, was the 160th 
anniversary of New York legislature’s adoption of the Field 
Code. It is still the symbolic cornerstone of the rickety system we 
have today. Six generations of failure are enough; it is time for 
change. Knowledge of German Relationstechnik should inform 
that change.32
 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE AND REFORM 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), re-
printed in 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFES-
SIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879). 
See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods 
and the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517, 562-566 (2006). 
32 The acceptance of special pleading in 19th century America dispels the idea 
that present-day story-writing procedures are mandated by the constitutional 
requirement of trial by jury. All that the Constitution requires is a jury trial of 
disputed issues of material fact.   
